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Abstract
In this work, we present a logic based on first-order CTL, namely
Game Analysis Logic (GAL), in order to reason about games. We relate
models and solution concepts of Game Theory as models and formulas of
GAL, respectively. Precisely, we express extensive games with perfect in-
formation as models of GAL, and Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect
equilibrium by means of formulas of GAL. From a practical point of view,
we provide a GAL model checker in order to analyze games automatically.
We use our model checker in at least two directions: to find solution con-
cepts of Game Theory; and, to analyze players that are based on standard
algorithms of the AI community, such as the minimax procedure.
1 Introduction
Games are abstract models of decision-making in which decision-makers (play-
ers) interact in a shared environment to accomplish their goals. Several models
have been proposed to analyze a wide variety of applications in many disciplines
such as mathematics, computer science and even political and social sciences
among others.
Game Theory [17] has its roots in the work of von Neumann and Morgen-
stern [16] and uses mathematics in order to model and analyze games in which
the decision-makers pursue rational behavior in the sense that they choose their
actions after some process of optimization and take into account their knowledge
or expectations of the other players’ behavior. Game Theory provides general
game definitions as well as reasonable solution concepts for many kinds of situa-
tions in games. Typical examples of this kind of research come from phenomena
emerging from Markets, Auctions and Elections.
Although historically Game Theory has been considered more suitable to
perform quantitative analysis than qualitative ones, there has been a lot of ap-
proaches that emphasizes Game Analysis on a qualitative basis, by using an
adequate logic in order to express games as well as their solution concepts.
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Some of the most representatives of these logics are: Coalitional Logic [20];
Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) [2] and its variation Counter-factual
ATL (CATL) [25]; Game Logic [21]; Game Logic with Preferences [26]; Coali-
tional Game Logic (CGL) [1] that reasons about coalitional games. To see more
details about the connections and open problems between logic and games, we
point out [24].
The technique of Model Checking [8] is frequently employed in computer sci-
ence to accomplish formal validation of both software and hardware [6]. Model
Checking consists of achieving automatic verification and other forms of formal
analysis of a system behavior. A lot of implementations are available in the
literature, such as Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) [15], SPIN [11] and MOCHA
[3]. Some other implementations also include specific features in the model-
ing, UPPAAL [5] works in real-time, HYTECH [10] with hybrid automata and
PRISM [19] with stochastic automata. Recently, model checking has also been
used to verify proprieties in games [27, 4, 26, 12].
There is a wide range of problems approachable by means of Game The-
ory. Besides problems and models coming from economics, which usually have
quantitative features, as those normally present in econometric models, there
is also a range of problems that are strongly related to Multi-Agent systems
modeling and that can be consequently also validated by means of well-known
CAV tools. However, the presence of intrinsic and quantitative measures in this
kind of modeling prevent us from an standard use of the most popular (and
efficient) CAV tools, such as Model Checkers (MCs) based on the propositional
logic language. One could argue that MCs, like the SPIN MC, that have a
richer operational semantics, such as its ability to assign computable meaning
to transitions by means of fragments of a Programming Language like coding
assertion, might be the right answer to the specification of such kind of model-
ing. However, the SPIN logic language is not a First-Order logic language, and
hence, cannot make assertions on the internal structure of an state, mainly re-
garding the relationship between the values assigned to the individuals in these
states (worlds), properties regarding the very individuals and so generalizations
and existential assertions on a state and its individuals cannot be, in general,
expressible. Most of the solution concepts used in Game Theory are expressed
as general assertions on the relationship between individuals of a possible state-
of-affairs in the game. The SPIN logic language is unable, in general, to express
such kind of concept either. Concerning the usefulness of an approach based
on a logic language more expressible than the presently used in CAV tools, it
is worth mentioning new directions in the MC community towards the use of
First-Order Logic (see [18, 9]). Thus, this article contributes for this kind of
research in the Formal Methods community, by providing a First-Order based
approach to the problem of validating models able to be expressed by Game
Theoretical means. The present approach is not so restricted, since the authors
have already presented a result showing how Multi-Agent systems can be viewed
and strongly considered as a Game, such that, main solution concepts on the
Game side represent important concepts on the Systems side ([30]).
The aim of this article is to present GAL (Game Analysis Logic), a logic
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based on first-order CTL, in order to reason about games in which a model
of GAL is a game, and a formula of GAL is an analysis. We illustrate our
approach by showing that GAL is suitable to express models of Game Theory
as well as their solution concepts. Precisely, we specify extensive game with
perfect information by means of models of GAL. We also express their main
solution concepts - namely Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium -
by means of formulas of GAL. In [28], we express the standard noncooperative
models (strategic games and the solution concept of Nash equilibrium) and
cooperative models (coalition game and the solution concept of Core). In this
article, we focus on the extensive games and the solution concepts of Nash
equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.
As GAL has a first-order apparatus, we are able to define many concepts,
such as utility, in an easier way, when compared to the logics mentioned above.
Moreover, a first-order apparatus is essential to model and reason about social
problems that have been modeled by Game Theory, Econometric Models, etc, as
already said. It is worth mentioning that the ATL logic, in which the operators
of CTL are parameterized by sets of players, can be seen as a fragment of
GAL, using the first-order feature of GAL; thus, there is no need for such a
parameterization in GAL. In addition, the CGL logic, which is designed to
reason about cooperative models, can also be embed in GAL. See [28] for the
proofs that ATL and CGL can be seen as fragments of GAL. We do not focus
on such proofs here.
We also provide a model checking algorithm for GAL in order to demonstrate
that GAL can be used in practice to analyze games automatically. We have a
prototype of a model checker for GAL that has been developed according to the
main intentions of the approach advocated here. The model checker is available
for download at www.tecmf.inf.puc-rio.br/DaviRomero. All of the examples in
this article are implemented in the tool. We will show that, using our prototype,
we are able to find solution concepts of Game Theory and to analyze players
that are based on standard algorithms [23] of the AI community.
This work is divided into six parts: Section 2 introduces Game Analysis
Logic; A model checking algorithm for GAL is presented in Section 3. Standard
concepts of Game Theory are expressed in GAL in Section 4. Section 5 presents
some experimental results using our algorithm. Finally, Section 6 concludes this
work.
2 Game Analysis Logic (GAL)
GAL is a many-sorted modal first-order logic language that is a logic based on
the standard Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [7]. A game is a model of GAL,
called game analysis logic structure, and an analysis is a formula of GAL.
The games that we model are represented by a set of states SE and a set of
actions CA.
A state is defined by both a first-order interpretation and a set of players,
where: 1- The first-order interpretation is used to represent the choices and
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the consequences of the players’ decisions. For example, we can use a list to
represent the history of the players’ choices until certain state; 2- The set of
players represents the players that have to decide simultaneously at a state.
This set must be a subset of the players’ set of the game. The other players
cannot make a choice at this state. For instance, we can model games such as
auction games, where all players are in all states, or even games as Chess or
turn-based synchronous game structure, where only a single player has to make
a choice at each state. Notice that we may even have some states where none
of the players can make a decision that can be seen as states of the nature.
An action is a relation between two states e1 and e2, where all players in
the state e1 have committed themselves to move to the state e2. Note that this
is an extensional view of how the players committed themselves to take a joint
action.
We refer to (Ak)k∈K as a sequence of Ak’s with the index k ∈ K. Sometimes
we will use more than one index as in the example (Ak,l)k,l∈K×L. We can also
use (Ak, Bl)k∈K,l∈L to denote the sequence of (Ak)k∈K followed by the sequence
(Bl)l∈L. Throughout of this article, when the sets of indexes are clear in the
context, we will omit them.
A path pi(e) is a sequence of states (finite or infinite) that could be reached
through the set of actions from a given state e that has the following properties:
1- The first element of the sequence is e; 2- If the sequence is infinite pi(e) =
(ek)k∈N, then ∀k ≥ 0 we have 〈ek, ek+1〉 ∈ CA; 3- If the sequence is finite
pi(e) = (e0, . . . , el), then ∀k such that 0 ≤ k < l we have 〈ek, ek+1〉 ∈ CA and
there is no e′ such that 〈el, e′〉 ∈ CA. The game behavior is characterized by its
paths that can be finite or infinite. Finite paths end in a state where the game
is over, while infinite ones represent a game that will never end.
Below we present the formal syntax and semantics of GAL. As usual, we
call the sets of sorts S, predicate symbols P , function symbols F and players
N as a non-logic language in contrast to the logic language that contains the
quantifiers and the connectives. We define a term of a sort in a standard way.
We denote a term t of sort s as ts. The modalities can be read as follows.
• [EX]α - ‘exists a path α in the next state’
• [AX]α - ‘for all paths α in the next state’
• [EF ]α - ‘exists a path α in the future’
• [AF ]α - ‘for all paths α in the future’
• [EG]α - ‘exists a path α globally’
• [AG]α - ‘for all paths α globally’
• E(αUβ) - ‘exists a path α until β’
• A(αUβ) - ‘for all paths α until β’
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Definition 1 (Syntax of GAL). Let 〈S, F, P,N〉 be a non-logic language, and
t1s1 , ..., t
n
sn be terms, and t
′
s1 be a term, and p : s1...sn be a predicate symbol, and
i be a player, and xs be a variable of sort s. The logic language of GAL is
generated by the following BNF definition:
Φ ::= > | ⊥ | i | p(t1s1 , . . . , tnsn) | (t1s1 ≈ t′s1) | (¬Φ) | (Φ∧Φ) | (Φ∨Φ) | (Φ→ Φ)
| [EX]Φ | [AX]Φ | [EF ]Φ | [AF ]Φ | [EG]Φ | [AG]Φ | E(Φ U Φ) | A(Φ U Φ)
| ∃xsΦ | ∀xsΦ
It is well-known that the operators ∧,∨,⊥, [EX], [AF ], [EF ], [AG], [EG] and
∀x can be given by the following usual abbreviations.
• ⊥ ⇐⇒ ¬>
• α ∧ β ⇐⇒ ¬(α→ ¬β)
• α ∨ β ⇐⇒ (¬α→ β)
• [EX]α ⇐⇒ ¬[AX]¬α
• [AF ]α ⇐⇒ A(> U α)
• [EF ]α ⇐⇒ E(> U α)
• [AG]α ⇐⇒ ¬E(> U ¬α)
• [EG]α ⇐⇒ ¬A(> U ¬α)
• ∀xα(x) ⇐⇒ ¬∃x¬α(x)
Definition 2 (Structure of GAL). Let 〈S, F, P,N〉 be a non-logic language of
GAL. A Game Analysis Logic Structure for this non-logic language is a
tuple G = 〈SE,SEo, CA, (Ds), (Ff,e), (Pp,e), (Ne)〉 such that:
• SE is a non-empty set, called the set of states.
• SEo is a set of initial states, where SEo ⊆ SE.
• For each state e ∈ SE, Ne is a subset of N .
• CA ⊆ SE × SE, called the set of actions of the game1, in which if there
is at least one player in the state e1, then exists a state e2 such that
〈e1, e2〉 ∈ CA.
• For each sort s ∈ S, Ds is a non-empty set, called the domain of sort s2.
• For each function symbol f : s1× . . .×sn → s of F and each state e ∈ SE,
Ff,e is a function such that Ff,e : Ds1 × . . .×Dsn → Ds.
1This relation is not required to be total as in the CTL case. The idea is because we have
finite games.
2In algebraic terminology Ds is a carrier for the sort s.
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• For each predicate symbol p : s1 × . . .× sn of P and state e ∈ SE, Pp,e is
a relation such that Pp,e ⊆ Ds1 × . . .×Dsn .
A function or predicate is rigidly interpreted if its interpretation is
the same for every state. A GAL-structure is finite if the set of states SE
and each set of domains Ds are finite. Otherwise, it is infinite. Note that even
when a GAL-structure is finite we might have infinite paths.
In order to provide the semantics of GAL, we define a valuation function as
a mapping σs that assigns to each free variable xs of sort s some member σs(xs)
of domain Ds. As we use terms, we extend every function σs to a function σ¯s
from state and term to element of sort s that is done in a standard way. When
the valuation functions are not necessary, we will omit them.
Definition 3 (Semantics of GAL). Let G = 〈SE,SEo, CA, (Ds), (Ff,e), (Pp,e),
(Ne)〉 be a GAL-structure, and (σs) be valuation functions, and α be a GAL-
formula, where s ∈ S, f ∈ F, p ∈ P and e ∈ SE. We write G, (σs) |=e α to
indicate that the state e satisfies the formula α in the structure G with
valuation functions (σs). The formal definition of satisfaction |= proceeds as
follows:
• G, (σs) |=e >.
• G, (σs) |=e i⇐⇒ i ∈ Ne
• G, (σs) |=e p(t1s1 , ..., tnsn)⇐⇒ 〈σ¯s1(e, t1s1), ..., σ¯sn(e, tnsn)〉 ∈ Pp,e
• G, (σs) |=e (t1s1 ≈ t′s1)⇐⇒ σ¯s1(e, t1s1) = σ¯s1(e, t′s1)
• G, (σs) |=e ¬α ⇐⇒ NOT G, (σs) |=e α
• G, (σs) |=e (α→ β) ⇐⇒ IF G, (σs) |=e α THEN G, (σs) |=e β
• G, (σs) |=e [AX]α⇐⇒ ∀e′ ∈ SE such that 〈e, e′〉 ∈ CA we have G, (σs) |=e′
α (see Figure 1.a).
• G, (σs) |=e E(α U β)⇐⇒ exists a finite (or infinite) path pi(e) = (e0e1e2...ei),
such that exists a k where k ≥ 0, and G, (σs) |=ek β, and for all j where
0 ≤ j < k, and G, (σs) |=ej α (see Figure 1.b).
• G, (σs) |=e A(α U β) ⇐⇒ for all finite (and infinite) paths such that
pi(e) = (e0e1e2...ei), exists a k where k ≥ 0, and G, (σs) |=ek β, and for
all j where 0 ≤ j < k, and G, (σs) |=ej α (see Figure 1.c).
• G, (σs, σsk) |=e ∃xskα⇐⇒ exists d ∈ Dsk such that G, (σs, σsk(xsk |d)) |=e
α, where σsk(xsk |d) is the function which is exactly like σsk except for one
thing: At the variable xsk it assumes the value d. This can be expressed
by the equation:
σs(xsk |d)(y) =
{
σs(y), if y 6= xsk
d, if y = xsk
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(a) - [AX]α (b) - E(α Uβ) (c) - A(α Uβ)
Figure 1: Modal Connectives of GAL.
3 Satisfatibility and Model Checking for GAL
It is well-known that there is no sound and complete system for a first-order
CTL [22]. Thus, GAL is also non-axiomatizable. However, we argue that, using
model checking for GAL, we can reason about games as well. Besides that we
can also define a non-complete axiomatization of GAL in order to cope with
proofs of interesting results, such as the existence of mixed Nash equilibrium
in strategic games, but we do not focus on this in this article. In the sequel
we state the model checking problem for GAL and also discuss briefly a model
checking algorithm for GAL.
Let G = 〈SE,SEo, CA, (Ds), (Ff,e), (Pp,e), (Ne)〉 be a GAL-structure with
the non-logic language 〈S, F, P,N〉, and (σs) be valuation functions and α be
a GAL-formula. The GAL model checking problem is to find the set of states
that satisfies the formula α.
{e ∈ SE | G, (σs) |=e α}
In order to have a model checking algorithm for GAL, we assume that all of
the games are finite; however, we might still have infinite behavior.
The algorithm for solving the GAL model checking problem uses an explicit
representation of the GAL-structure as a labelled, directed graph. The nodes
represent the states SE, the arcs in the graph provide the set of actions CA
and the labels associated with the nodes describe both the players’ set Ne and
the first-order interpretation (the interpreted functions’ set (Ff,e) and the inter-
preted predicates’ set (Pp,e)). The algorithm also uses the functionsD : S → Ds,
N : SE → Ne, F : F × SE → Ff,e and P : P × SE → Pp,e in order to provide
an implicit representation of the domains’ set (Ds), the players’ set Ne, the
functions (Ff,e) and the relations (Pp,e), respectively. Thus, we only evaluate
them on demand.
The algorithm is similar to the CTL model checking algorithm [8] that oper-
ates by labelling each state e ∈ SE with the set of labels(e) of sub-formulas of
α which are true in e. The algorithm starts with the set labels(e) as the empty
set3 and then goes by a series of steps (the number of operators in α). At each
3The CTL model checking algorithm starts the set of labels(e) as the set of propositions
in e. In our algorithm we just evaluate the predicates and functions on demand.
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step k, sub-formulas with k − 1 nested GAL operators are processed. When a
formula is processed, it is added to the labelling of the state in which it is true.
Thus, G, (σs) |=e α⇐⇒ α ∈ labels(e).
As GAL-formulas are represented in terms of i, p(t1s1 , ..., t
n
sn), (t
1
s1≈t′s1), (¬α),
(α→ β), ∃xskα, [AX]α, E(αUβ), A(αUβ), it is sufficient to handle these cases.
The cases (¬α), (α→ β), [AX]α, E(αUβ) and A(αUβ) are similar to the CTL
model checking algorithm and we do not present here (see [15] for more details).
Below we present and give the time complexity of the other procedures. In order
to guarantee termination of the algorithm, the functions (Ff,e) and the relations
(Pp,e) must terminate since the model is finite this is accomplished. We use the
notation σ¯s1(e, t
1
s1) as the function that interprets the term t
1
s1 at the state e.
We take its complexity as an upper bound on the implementation of σ¯s1 taking
all states into account. We refer to this upper bound as |σ¯s1(e, t1s1)|.
• Case i: The procedure verifyPlayer (see Algorithm 1) labels all states
e ∈ SE with the player i if the player i belongs to the set of players in e.
This procedure requires time O(|SE|).
• Case p(t1s1 , ..., tnsn): The procedure verifyPredicate (see Algorithm 2) labels
all states e ∈ SE in which the interpretation of the predicate p with the
interpretation of terms t1s1 , ..., t
n
sn is true in e. This procedure requires
time O((|σ¯s1(e, t1s1)|+ ...+ |σ¯sn(e, tnsn)|)× |SE|). 4
• Case t1s1≈t′s1 : The procedure verifyEquality (see Algorithm 3) labels all
state e ∈ SE in which the interpretation of the terms t1s1 and t′s1 are equal.
The time complexity is O((|σ¯s1(e, t1s1)|+ |σ¯sn(e, t′s1)|)× |SE|).
• The procedure verifyExists (see Algorithm 4) labels all states e ∈ SE in
which the formula α with all occurrences of the variable xsk substituted by
at least one element of the domain is true. We use the notation α[xsk ←
d] as a function that substitutes all occurrence of xsk by d in α. This
procedure requires O(|Dsk | × |SE|).
Thus, the complexity of the algorithm regards to: 1- The size of the domains’
set; 2- The size of the states’ set; 3- The size of the actions’ set; 4- The complexity
of both functions and predicates in each state.
Algorithm 1 procedure verifyPlayer(i)
for all e ∈ SE do
if i ∈ N (e) then
label(e) := label(e) ∪ {i}
end if
end for
4Notice that the evaluation of the terms and the predicate are done in all states and the
time complexity of them could not be polynomial.
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Algorithm 2 procedure verifyPredicate(p(t1s1 , ..., t
n
sn))
for all e ∈ SE do
if 〈σ¯s1(e, t1s1), ..., σ¯sn(e, tnsn)〉 ∈ P(p, e) then
label(e) := label(e) ∪ {p(t1s1 , ..., tnsn)}
end if
end for
Algorithm 3 procedure verifyEquality(t1s1 ≈ t′s1)
for all e ∈ SE do
if σ¯s1(e, t
1
s1) = σ¯s1(e, t
′
s1) then
label(e) := label(e) ∪ {t1s1 ≈ t′s1}
end if
end for
Algorithm 4 procedure verifyExists(∃xskα)
for all d ∈ D(sk) do
T := {e | α[xsk ← d] ∈ label(e)}
for all e ∈ T do
if ∃xskα 6∈ label(e) then
label(e) := label(e) ∪ {∃xskα}
end if
end for
end for
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Below we consider a simpler version of GAL, for the sake of a simpler pre-
sentation of the algorithm’s complexity. The non-logical language has only one
sort D and one unary predicate p : D. Let GS be a GAL-structure, where: 1-
The predicate p is interpreted as constant for all states and its time complexity
is represented by O(p); 2- The size of sort D’s domain is |D|; 3- The size of the
states’ set is |SE|; 4- The size of the actions’ set is |CA|. Let α be a GAL-formula
for this language, where αM and αD are the number of modal connectives and
the number of quantifier connectives, respectively, in the formula α. The time
complexity to verify α for GS is
O(|D|αD × |αM | × ((|SE| ×O(p)) + |CA|))
We have a prototype, namely Game Analysis Logic Verifier (GALV), that
was written as framework in Java. GALV is available for download at http://www.tecmf.inf.puc-
rio.br/DaviRomero. All of the examples that we will show in this article are
implemented in our prototype. The main advantages of this model checker are:
1- It allows the use of abstract data types, for example, a list can be used to
represent the history of the game; 2- It might use a large sort of libraries that
are available in Java; 3- Functions and predicates might be used to analyze
games, such as the evaluation functions that are used in the AI community to
provide an estimate of the expected utility of the game from a given position; 4-
GALV allows computational aspects to define the players’ actions, for example,
a minimax algorithm can be used to define the actions of a certain player, while
the other players might use different algorithms. So, the time complexity to
generate a game might not be polynomial, i.e., it depends on the algorithms
that have been used to define the players’ actions.
4 Game Theory in Game Analysis Logic
We can model both the standard models and the standard solution concepts
of Game Theory using GAL. In this section we show that the standard models
are related to as GAL-structures and the standard solution concepts are related
to as GAL-formulas. Precisely, we present the correspondence between the
extensive games and the GAL-structures as well as the solution concepts of Nash
equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and the formulas of
GAL. For more details about the rationale of the definitions related to Game
Theory see [17]. In the sequel, we write down the definitions and theorems used
in this article.
An extensive game is a model in which each player can consider his or her
plan of action at every time of the game at which he or she has to make a
choice. There are two kinds of models: game with perfect information; and
games with imperfect information. For the sake of simplicity we restrict the
games to models of perfect information. A general model that allows imperfect
information is straightforward. Below we present the formal definition and the
example depicted in Figure 2.a.
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Definition 4. An extensive game with perfect information is a tuple
〈N,H,P, (ui)〉, where
• N is a set, called the set of players.
• H is a set of sequences of actions (finite or infinite), called the set of
histories, that satisfies the following properties
– the empty sequence is a history, i.e. ∅ ∈ H.
– if (ak)k∈K ∈ H where K ⊆ N and for all l ≤ |K|, then (ak)k=0,...,l ∈
H.
– if (a0 . . . ak) ∈ H for all k ∈ N, then the infinite sequence (a0a1 . . .) ∈
H.
A history h is terminal if it is infinite or it has no action a such that
(h, a) ∈ H. We refer to T as the set of terminals.
• P is a function that assigns to each non-terminal history a player.
• For each player i ∈ N , a utility function ui on T .
Example 1. An example of a two-player extensive game 〈N,H,P, (ui)〉, where:
• N = {1, 2};
• H = {∅, (A), (B), (A,L), (A,R)};
• P(∅) = 1 and P((A)) = 2;
• u1((B)) = 1, u1((A,L)) = 0, u1((A,R)) = 2;
• u2((B)) = 2,u2((A,L)) = 0,u2((A,R)) = 1.
A strategy of player i is a function that assigns an action for each non-
terminal history for each P (h) = i. For the purpose of this article, we represent
a strategy as a tuple. In order to avoid confusing when we refer to the strategies
or the histories, we use ‘〈’ and ‘〉’ to the strategies and ‘(’ and ‘)’ to the histories.
In Example 1, player 1 has to make a decision only after the initial state and he
or she has two strategies 〈A〉 and 〈B〉. Player 2 has to make a decision after the
history (A) and he or she has two strategies 〈L〉 and 〈R〉. We denote Si as the
set of player i’s strategies. We denote s = (si) as a strategy profile. We refer
to O(s1, . . . , sn) as an outcome that is the terminal history when each player
follows his or her strategy si. In Example 1, 〈〈B〉, 〈L〉〉 is a strategy profile in
which the player 1 chooses B after the initial state and the player 2 chooses L
after the history (A), and O(〈B〉, 〈L〉) is the outcome (B). In a similar way,
we refer to Oh(h,s1, . . . , sn) as the outcome when each player follows his or
her strategy si from history h. In Example 1, Oh((A), 〈B〉, 〈L〉) is the outcome
(A,L) and u1((A), 〈B〉, 〈L〉) = u1((A,L)) = 0.
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Figure 2: Mapping an extensive game into a GAL model.
We can model an extensive game Γ = 〈N,H,P, (ui)〉 as a GAL-structure
in the following way. Each history h ∈ H (from the extensive game) is rep-
resented by a state, in which a 0-ary symbol h designates a history of Γ (the
one that the state is coming from), so h is a non-rigid designator. The set of
the actions of the GAL-structure is determined by the set of actions of each
history, i.e., given a history h ∈ H and an action a such that (h, a) ∈ H, then
the states namely h and (h, a) are in the set of actions of the GAL-structure,
i.e. 〈h, (h, a)〉 ∈ CA. Function P determines the player that has to make a
choice at every state, i.e. Nh = {P (h)}. The utilities functions are rigidly
defined as in the extensive game. The initial state is the state represented by
the initial history of the extensive game, i.e. Ho = {∅}. Sorts H and T are
interpreted as the histories and terminal histories of the extensive game, respec-
tively, i.e., DH = H and DT = T . Sort U represents the utility values and
is interpreted as the set of all possible utility values of the extensive game5.
In order to define the solution concept of the subgame perfect equilibrium and
the Nash equilibrium, we add to this structure the sets of players’ strategies
(DSi) and functions O and Oh. To summarize, a GAL-structure for an ex-
tensive game with perfect information Γ = 〈N,P,H, (ui)〉 is the tuple
〈H,Ho, CA, (DH ,DT ,DSi ,DU), (ui, hh, O,Oh), (≥) , (Nh)〉 with non-logic lan-
guage 〈(H,T, Si, U) , (h :→ H,ui : T → U,O : S → T,Oh : H × S → T )
, (≥: U × U), N〉. The example below is the GAL-structure (see Figure 2.b) of
Example 1 (see Figure 2.a).
Example 2. The GAL-structure of Example 1 is 〈H,Ho, CA, (DH ,DT ,DS1 ,DS2 ,DU), (hh, u1, u2,
O,Oh), (≥), (Nh)〉 with non-logic language 〈(H,T, S1, S2, U), (h :→ H,u1 : T →
U, u2 : T → U,O : S1 × S2 → T, Oh : H × S1 × S2 → T ), (≥: U × U), {1, 2}〉
where
• H = {∅, (A), (B), (A,L), (A,R)} and Ho = {∅}.
5Note that this set is finite if the game is finite.
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• CA = {〈∅, (A)〉, 〈∅, (B)〉, 〈(A), (A,L)〉, 〈(A), (A,R)〉}.
• DS1 = {〈A〉, 〈B〉}, DS2 = {〈L〉, 〈R〉} and DU = {0, 1, 2}.
• DH = {∅, (A), (B), (A,L), (A,R)} and DT = {(B), (A,L), (A,R)}.
• h∅ = ∅, h(A) = (A), h(B) = (B), h(A,L) = (A,L), h(A,R) = (A,R).
• N∅ = {1}, N(A) = {2}, N(B) = N(A,L) = N(A,R) = {}.
• Functions O, Oh, u1 and u2 are rigidly defined as in the extensive game.
The most used solution concepts for extensive games are Nash equilibrium
(NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). The solution concept of NE re-
quires that each player’s strategy be optimal, given the other players’ strategies.
And, the solution concept of SPE requires that the action prescribed by each
player’s strategy be optimal, given the other players’ strategies, after every his-
tory. In SPE concept, the structure of the extensive game is taken into account
explicitly, while, in the solution concept of NE, the structure is taken into ac-
count only implicity in the definition of the strategies. Below we present the SPE
definition in a standard way. The NE definition below regards to the structure
of an extensive game, yet is an equivalent one to the standard.
Definition 5. A subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of an extensive game
Γ = 〈N,H,P, (ui)〉 is a strategy profile s∗ = 〈s∗1, . . . , s∗n〉 such that for every
player i ∈ N and every history h ∈ H for which P (h) = i we have
ui(Oh(h, s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
n)) ≥ ui(Oh(h, s∗1, . . . , si, . . . , s∗n)),
for every strategy si ∈ Si.
Definition 6. A Nash equilibrium (NE) of an extensive game Γ = 〈N,H,P, (ui)〉
is a strategy profile s∗ = 〈s∗1, . . . , s∗n〉 such that for every player i ∈ N and every
history on the path of the strategy profile s∗ (i.e. h ∈ O(s∗)) for which P (h) = i
we have
ui(Oh(h, s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
n)) ≥ ui(Oh(h, s∗1, . . . , si, . . . , s∗n)),
for every strategy si ∈ Si.
We invite the reader to verify that the strategy profiles 〈〈A〉, 〈R〉〉 and
〈〈B〉, 〈L〉〉 are the Nash equilibria in Example 1. Game theorists can argue
that the solution 〈〈B〉, 〈L〉〉 is not reasonable when the players regard to the
sequence of the actions. To see that the reader must observe that after the
history (A) there is no way for player 2 commit himself or herself to choose L
instead of R since he or she will be better off choosing R (his or her utility is 1
instead of 0). Thus, player 2 has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium,
so this solution is not a subgame perfect equilibrium. On the other hand, we in-
vite the reader to verify that the solution 〈〈A〉, 〈R〉〉 is the only subgame perfect
equilibrium.
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Consider formulas 1 and 2 as expressing subgame perfect equilibrium def-
inition 5 and Nash equilibrium definition 6, respectively. A strategy profile
s∗ = 〈s∗1, . . . , s∗n〉 is a SPE (or NE) if and only if formula 1 (or formula 2) holds
at the initial state ∅, where each σSi(v∗si) = s∗i .
[AG]
( ∧
i∈N
i→ ∀vsi (ui(Oh(h, v∗s1 , . . . , v∗sn)) ≥ ui(Oh(h, v∗s1 , . . . , vsi , . . . , v∗sn)))
)
(1)
[EG]
 h ∈ O(v∗s1 , . . . , v∗sn) ∧( ∧
i∈N
i→ ∀vsi (ui(Oh(h, v∗s1 , . . . , v∗sn)) ≥ ui(Oh(h, (v∗s1 , . . . , vsi , . . . , v∗sn))))
) 
(2)
In order to guarantee the correctness of the representation of both subgame
perfect equilibrium and Nash equilibrium, we state the theorem below. The
proof is provided in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Let Γ be an extensive game, and GΓ be a GAL-structure for Γ,
and α be a subgame perfect equilibrium formula for G as defined in Equation 1,
and β be a Nash equilibrium formula as defined in Equation 2, and (s∗i ) be a
strategy profile, and (σSi) be valuations functions for sorts (Si).
• A strategy profile (s∗i ) is a SPE of Γ⇐⇒ GΓ,(σSi)|=∅ α, where each σSi(v∗si) =
s∗i
• A strategy profile (s∗i ) is a NE of Γ⇐⇒ GΓ,(σSi)|=∅ β, where each σSi(v∗si) =
s∗i
5 Experimental Results
In this section we show the performance of the GAL model checking algorithm
against other algorithms. The algorithm was written in Java and the experi-
ments were executed on a 2.4GHz Celeron with 512 MBytes of RAM, running
Windows XP Home Edition.
Several algorithms for the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium are pro-
posed in the literature (see [14] for a survey). Most of them compute a mixed
Nash equilibrium. Gambit [13] is the best-known Game Theory software that
implements most of all algorithms. We use both Gambit (with its EnumPure-
Solve method) and our algorithm in order to compute the pure Nash Equilibria.
Figure 3 shows the running times (in seconds) of several two-player games in
which the payoffs of the games were randomly generated (Figure 3.a) or were
taken as the constant value 0 (Figure 3.b). The difference between the games
in Figure 3.a and Figure 3.b relies on the size of the set of equilibria. Our algo-
rithm took almost the same time to find the solution concept regardless of the
size of equilibria. On the other hand, Gambit’s performance was much more
dependent on the size of equilibria as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Two-player games.
In [27, 29] is proposed a metalanguage to describe games, namely RollGame,
as well as a translation into the input language of the well-known SMV model
checker [15], in order to reason about games. In this section, we take Tic-Tac-
Toe game in order to provide an example that an explicit representation of such
a game can be more efficient than using an OBDD approach as in SMV. It
is worth mentioning that SMV uses a propositional logic (CTL), so it cannot
express many solution concepts as defined in Section 4. Moreover, it does not
allow the use of abstract data types, yet the usage of integer is prohibited in
many situations, such as when one wants to use utilities values.
In [27, 29], a version of a Tic-Tac-Toe game is modeled and analyzed. In
this version, one of the players (PlayerX) uses a certain strategy, while the other
player (PlayerO) spreads all possible actions. It is also shown that the strategy of
PlayerX never reaches a losing position in the game. This property is expressed
by the CTL formula defined in Equation 3 below, which states that PlayerX
will always win or draw. We also model this game with the same strategy using
our algorithm, and the performance of verifying this formula is much better
in our algorithm (0.001 seconds) than using the SMV model checker (45.211
seconds). However, we should also take into account the time to generate this
game in order to compare our algorithm with SMV. The required time was
0.289 seconds; so our algorithm took 0.290 seconds to generate and analyze this
version of Tic-Tac-Toe game6.
[AF ](winX ∨Draw) (3)
As we have claimed at the end of Section 3, one of the main advantages of the
GALV model checker is that it allows computational aspects in the modeling
language. Thus, we are able to use standard algorithms of the AI community to
model and analyze a game. We take Tic-Tac-Toe as an example again, and we
define one of the players (PlayerX), using a minimax algorithm with maximal
depth (9), while the other player (PlayerO) spreads all the possible actions. The
required time for generate the game was 14.718 seconds and to analyze the GAL
6Here, we refer to the average (arithmetic mean) time of 10 runs of each approach. The
standard deviation with SMV and our algorithm were 1.333 and 0.009, respectively.
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formula defined in Equation 3 was 0.001 seconds. Note that this approach is
not possible using a standard model checker, such as SMV or SPIN.
6 Conclusion and Future Works
In this work, we have presented a first-order modal logic (GAL) to model and
analyze games. We have also provided a model checking algorithm for GAL to
achieve automatic verification for finite games. We have illustrated in Section
4 that standard concepts of Game Theory can be modeled in GAL. Using our
prototype of a GAL model checker, we have performed case studies in at least
two directions: as a tool to find solution concepts of Game Theory; and as a tool
to analyze games that are based on standard algorithms of the AI community,
such as minimax algorithm. Despite the fact that our algorithm uses an explicit
representation, it outperforms the SMV model-checker as shown in Section 5.
This might suggest that an explicit representation is better for games than using
a symbolic representation as OBDD. However, a general conclusion cannot be
drawn. Some future works are still needed and are listed below
• Define an adequate and sound system of GAL that is able to prove formal
theorems of Game Theory, such as the existence of mixed Nash equilibrium
in strategic games.
• Implement a player of a game using formulas of GAL, such as the subgame
perfect equilibrium formula as shown in Section 4. This approach might
use evaluation functions and be limited to a certain depth as in a minimax
procedure. As this is an heuristic approach, we argue that define other
solution concepts in a logic framework is easier than to implement new
algorithms. For instance, we can define the strategy of a player according
to a conjunction of the subgame perfect formula and a Pareto Optimal
formula.
• Improve the performance of the GAL model checker, since it uses an ex-
plicit representation. We cannot use an OBDD-approach since in GAL we
are dealing with a first-order interpretation that may vary over the states
of the game.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 2. Let Γ be an extensive game, and GΓ be a GAL-structure for Γ,
and α be a subgame perfect equilibrium formula for G as defined in Equation 1,
and β be a Nash equilibrium formula as defined in Equation 2, and (s∗i ) be a
strategy profile, and (σSi) be valuations functions for sorts (Si).
• A strategy profile (s∗i ) is a SPE of Γ⇐⇒ GΓ,(σSi)|=∅ α, where each σSi(v∗si) =
s∗i
• A strategy profile (s∗i ) is a NE of Γ⇐⇒ GΓ,(σSi)|=∅ β, where each σSi(v∗si) =
s∗i
Proof. • A strategy profile (s∗i ) is a SPE of Γ ⇐⇒ GΓ, (σSi) |=∅ α, where
each σSi(v
∗
si) = s
∗
i .
A strategy profile (s∗i ) is a SPE of Γ.
⇐⇒ for every player i and every history h ∈ H for which P (h) = i we have
ui(Oh(h, s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
n)) ≥ ui(Oh(h, s∗1, . . . , si, . . . , s∗n)), for every strategy si ∈
Si.
By the definition of GΓ from Γ, we have that every state of GΓ, which
represents a history of Γ, is reached by a path from the initial state ∅;
moreover, we have that each domain of player i’s strategy DSi is inter-
preted by the set of strategies Si (i.e. DSi = Si), and the player that has
to take a move in a state ek, which represents the history hk, is defined
by the function P (i.e. Nek = {P (hk)}), and, finally, the symbol h is in-
terpreted in ek by the history hk (i.e. σ¯H(ek, h) = hk). As a consequence
of this definition, we have
⇐⇒for all paths pi(∅) = e0, e1, . . . and for all k ≥ 0, for every player i ∈ N
such that IF i ∈ Nek THEN we have for all di ∈ DSi
(ui(Oh(σ¯H(ek, h), s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
n) ≥ ui(Oh(σ¯H(ek, h), s∗1, . . . , di, . . . , s∗n))).
As function Oh and utility functions (ui) are rigidly interpreted as in the
extensive game Γ, we have
⇐⇒ for all paths pi(∅) = e0, e1, . . . and for all k ≥ 0, for every player i ∈ N
such that IF GΓ, (σSi) |=ek i THEN for all di ∈ DSi we have
GΓ, (σSi(vSi |di)) |=ek
(
ui(Oh(h, v
∗
S1
, . . . , v∗Sn)) ≥ ui(Oh(h, v∗S1 , . . . , vSi , . . . , v∗Sn))
)
,
where σSi(v
∗
Si
) = s∗i .
⇐⇒ for all paths pi(∅) = e0, e1, . . . and for all k ≥ 0 we have
GΓ, (σSi) |=ek
( ∧
i∈N
i→ ∀vSi
(
ui(Oh(h, v
∗
S1
, . . . , v∗Sn)) ≥ ui(Oh(h, v∗S1 , . . . , vSi , . . . , v∗Sn))
))
,
where each σSi(v
∗
Si
) = s∗i .
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⇐⇒ GΓ,(σSi)|=∅ [AG]
( ∧
i∈N
i→ ∀vSi
(
ui(Oh(h, v
∗
S1
, . . . , v∗Sn)) ≥ ui(Oh(h, v∗S1 , . . . , vSi , . . . , v∗Sn))
))
,
where each σSi(v
∗
Si
) = s∗i .
• A strategy profile (s∗i ) is a NE of Γ ⇐⇒ GΓ, (σSi) |=∅ β, where each
σSi(v
∗
si) = s
∗
i .
A strategy profile (s∗i ) is a NE of Γ.
⇐⇒ for every player i and every history h ∈ O(s∗) in which P (h) = i we
have
ui(O(s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
n)) ≥ ui(O(s∗1, . . . , si, . . . , s∗n)), for every strategy si ∈ Si.
We take the path pi(∅) = e0, e1, . . . in GΓ that is defined by histories
h0, h1, . . . on the equilibrium’s path O(s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
n) according to definition
of GΓ from Γ. We have
⇐⇒ there is a path pi(∅) = e0, e1, . . . such that for all k ≥ 0 we have
σ¯H(ek, h) ∈ O(s∗1, . . . , s∗n)
AND for every player i ∈ N IF i ∈ Nek THEN for all si ∈ Si we have
(ui(Oh(σ¯H(ek, h), s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
n)) ≥ ui(Oh(σ¯H(ek, h), (s∗1, . . . , si, . . . , s∗n)))),
where each σSi(v
∗
Si
) = s∗i .
As function O, Oh and utility functions (ui) are rigidly interpreted as in
the extensive game Γ, we have
⇐⇒ there is a path pi(∅) = e0, e1, . . . such that for all k ≥ 0 we have
GΓ, (σSi) |=ek h ∈ O(v∗S1 , . . . , v∗Sn) AND
GΓ, (σSi) |=ek
∧
i∈N
i→ ∀vSi
(
ui(Oh(h, v
∗
S1
, . . . , v∗Sn)) ≥ ui(Oh(h, (v∗S1 , . . . , vSi , . . . , v∗Sn)))
)
,
where each σSi(v
∗
Si
) = s∗i .
⇐⇒
GΓ, (σSi)|=∅ [EG]
 h ∈ O(v∗S1 , . . . , v∗Sn) ∧( ∧
i∈N
i→ ∀vSi
(
ui(Oh(h, v
∗
S1
, . . . , v∗Sn)) ≥ ui(Oh(h, (v∗S1 , . . . , vSi , . . . , v∗Sn)))
)),
where each σSi(v
∗
Si
) = s∗i .
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